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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-BYPASSING THE HEART OF NEWPORT V. 
FACT CONCERTS, INC., 453 U.S. 247 (198l}--Obtaining Punitive 
Damages from Municipalities for Civil Rights Violations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cause of action formulated in section 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 affords redress for infringements upon civil 
rights. l While this statute does not specify the damages recoverable 
for civil rights violations, injunctive and declaratory judgments, as 
well as compensatory and punitive damages, have been granted.2 
Defendants in these civil rights actions have included both individu­
als and local governing bodies.3 Recently, however, the United 
States Supreme Court in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 4 held that 
punitive damages were not recoverable from a municipal defendant 
I. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis­
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
Recovery for civil rights violations is increasingly being sought under this statute. In 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980), Justice Powell pointed out that "§1983 actions 
now constitute a substantial share of the federal caseload." Id at 27 (Powell, J., dissent­
ing). Justice Powell noted that the number of civil rights cases filed in federal court 
increased from 296 in 1961 to 13,113 in 1977, not including the numerous petitions filed 
by prisoners under section 1983. Id at 27 n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting). Less than twenty­
one section 1983 cases were decided in the first fifty years of the enactment of that statute 
in 1871. Id at 27; Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence ofan Adequate Federal 
Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). 
2. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 84-88 (3rd Cir. 1965) (§ 1983 is silent as to damages 
to be awarded but federal common law, applicable to civil rights statutes, permits recov­
ery of exemplary or punitive damages). 
3. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) the 
Court stated that H(l)ocal governing bodies, therefore, can be s~\ed directly under § 1983 
for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. ..." Id at 690. 
The individuals who themselves caused the deprivation of civil rights, their supervi­
sors, and the governmental unit from which their power was conferred (including school 
boards and police departments as well as cities and counties) have been named as de­
fendants in section 1983 cases. States remain immune from such suits by the eleventh 
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
4. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
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in a section 1983 action.5 
While the Fact Concerts Court stated clearly that punitive dam­
ages against municipalities were not available under federal law, it 
did not discuss the ability of a federal court to assess punitive dam­
ages against a municipality when such damages were permitted by 
state law. The issue of how to reconcile the history and purpose of 
section 1983, as seen by the Supreme Court, with a state's contrary 
interpretation of public policy and the purpose of punitive damages 
was not addressed by the Court. In fact, the Court stated that "[w]e 
do not address the propriety of the punitive damages awarded 
against petitioner [city] under Rhode Island law."6 The Court's re­
fusal to address this issue leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff 
in a federal court pursuing a section 1983 claim might be able to 
obtain punitive damages from a municipality, regardless of the 
seemingly absolute rule against such damages as embodied in Fact 
Concerts. 
In Fact Concerts, the Court attempted to limit the liability ex­
tended to municipalities in recent years for violations of civil rights.7 
The decision does not, however, render it completely impossible for 
a plaintiff in a section 1983 action to receive punitive damages from 
a municipal government. Two strategies remain available for the 
plaintiff in a proper jurisdictionS to seek and obtain punitive dam­
ages: (I) the use of section 1988 and (2) the doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction. These two methods will be addressed in this note to 
determine the availability of punitive damage awards from a munic­
ipal defendant when such awards are provided under the state law, 
notwithstanding the Fact Concerts decision. First, the history and 
purpose of section 1983 and the general theory behind punitive dam­
ages will be examined briefly to better determine the success of these 
5. Id at 271. Fact Concerts is one of the recent cases in which the Court has at­
tempted to define the limits of liability under section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167 (1961), the Court originally limited liability to non-municipal defendants. Monroe 
was overruled, however, by Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), when the Court held that municipal and other local governments were subject to 
suit under section 1983. Id at 663. The availability of official immunity to municipal 
defendants was left open by Monell Id at 701. The Court circumscribed the availability 
of this immunity in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), by disallowing a 
good faith immunity for municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. Id at 625. Fact 
Concerts further defines the liability of municipal defendants in section 1983 actions by 
making them immune from punitive damage awards. 453 U.S. at 271. 
6. Id at 253 n.6. 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. That is, under a state law which allows punitive damages against a municipality. 
Eg., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to 9-31-4 (Supp. 1982) and §§ 45-15-12, 45-15-13 (1980). 
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devices in bypassing the Fact Concerts decision in proper section 
1983 actions.9 The strategies will then be discussed and the potential 
for successfully attaining punitive damage awards from municipal 
defendants in light of Fact Concerts will be assessed. to 
II. FACT CONCERTS 
A. Procedural Development 
The city of Newport, Rhode Island, and certain city officials 
were named as defendants II in a section 1983 action alleging that 
revocation of a license to hold a concert deprived plaintiffs, Fact 
Concerts, Inc. (FCI), a promotional corporation,12 of its constitu­
tional rights to free expression and due process under color of state 
law.13 FCI had previously received state approval to produce a se­
ries of concerts at a local state park. 14 FCI then obtained an en­
tertainment license from the city of Newport and proceeded to make 
arrangements for the upcoming event. 15 
Originally, jazz singer Sarah Vaughn was one of the performers 
scheduled to appear at the concert. When she cancelled her per­
formance in Newport, FCI hired the group Blood, Sweat and Tears 
as a replacement. 16 The Newport city council, which included the 
Mayor of Newport, tried to prevent Blood, Sweat and Tears from 
appearing at the concert. The city council characterized Blood, 
Sweat and Tears as a rock group and, out of fear of crowd distur­
bances or a "rowdy and undesirable" audience, attempted to ban the 
concert entirely unless Blood, Sweat and Tears was removed from 
the program. 17 
The first of two special city council meetings was held at which 
the council would not investigate FCI's characterization of the 
group's music or look any further into the nature of the band's mu­
sic. IS Instead, the vote of the city council was to forbid the concert 
9. See infra notes 56-101 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 115-199 and accompanying text. 
II. The officials included the mayor of Newport and the six other members of the 
city council. 453 U.S. at 252. 
12. Also named as plaintiff was Marvin Lerman, the principal investor in FC!. 
13. 453 U.S. at 252. 
14. Id. at 249-50. 
15. Id. at 250. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Brief for the Respondents at 5, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247 (1981). 
196 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVfEW [Vol. 6:193 
unless Blood, Sweat and Tears did not play.19 The vote was publi­
cized and ticket sales for the concert decreased.20 
Later the same week, the mayor and city council informed FCI 
that Blood, Sweat and Tears would be allowed to perform if no rock 
music was played.21 At the second special city council meeting held 
the day before the concert was to take place, the council decided to 
revoke FCI's license altogether for failure to fulfill the conditions of 
the contract, although the council knew the terms of the contract had 
been substantially met.22 
On the morning the concert was scheduled to begin, FCI ob­
tained a restraining order to enjoin interference with the concert by 
the city or its officials.23 The concert proceeded and included a per­
formance by Blood, Sweat and Tears. Less than half the potential 
ticket sales were realized, however, and plaintiffs lost approximately 
$72,910.24 
FCI then instituted a suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Rhode Island, claiming its constitutional rights of free 
expression and due process had been violated under section 1983.25 
Three pendent state tort claims were also brought. 26 Compensatory 
and punitive damages were sought with respect to all the claims. 
The jury in the district court found for FCI and awarded both com­
pensatory and punitive damages.27 The defendant city and its offi­
19. 453 U.S. at 251. 
20. fd. 
21. fd. Apparently, the threat that Blood, Sweat and Tears was intending to bring 
suit against the city for injury to its reputation was a factor in the council's change of 
mind. Joint Appendix at 64, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. 
22. 453 U.S. at 251-52, 251 n.4. The council's criticisms of FCI's compliance with 
the contract were described as "picayune" and "frivolous" by the director of the Rhode 
Island Department of Natural Resources, who had examined the concert site prior to the 
revocation of the license. The director had informed the City Manager of his opinions 
and volunteered to appear at the second council meeting. He was told he was not 
needed. fd. at 251 n.4. 
23. fd. at 252. 
24. fd. at 253. 
25. Amended Complaint in Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 20, 23. 
26. The state law claims alleged breach of contract, interference with contractual 
relationships and tortious interference with advantageous relationships. fd. at 24-26. At 
trial, the multiple state claims were reduced to a single claim for interference with con­
tractual relationships. Brief for the Petitioners at 6, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
27. Compensatory damages of $72,910 and punitive damages of $275,000 were 
awarded. The punitive damage award was divided between the city officials and the city 
itself. Seventy-five thousand dollars of the punitive damages award was assessed against 
the city officials and the remaining $200,000 was assessed against the city of Newport as 
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cials moved for a new trial on the grounds that punitive damages 
may not be awarded against a municipality under section 198328 and 
in the alternative, the damages awarded were excessive.29 The dis­
trict court found no reason why punitive damages should not be 
awarded against municipalities as well as individuals in appropriate 
circumstances.3o The motion for a new trial was denied, although 
the award was found to be excessive.31 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit af­
firmed the district court decision,32 stating that this area of law was 
in a state of flUX. 33 The appellate court stated that punitive damages 
were available against municipalities in certain circumstances,34 just 
as they were available against individual defendants.35 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the confusion 
surrounding this issue,36 and held that punitive damages were not 
available against municipal defendants in section 1983 suits.37 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
In a majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court 
re-examined the congressional intent behind enactment of section 
1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to determine the extent of 
municipal immunity from punitive damages.38 The Court found 
punitive damages. 453 U.S. at 253. The district court ordered, and the plaintiff accepted, 
a remittitur in the punitive damage award against the city, reducing the award to $75,000 
against the city. Id at 254 n.8; Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 68. 
28. 453 U.S. at 253. 
29. Id 
30. Id at 254; see supra note 27. The district court considered the challenge to the 
punitive damages instruction even though it was untimely under FED. R. CIV. P. 51 and 
no objection had been made at trial. Id at 255-56. 
31. Id at 254. 
32. 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). The 
appellate court also noted the failure to object to the punitive damages instructions under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 51. Id at 1067. 
33. Id 
34. The Court of Appeals stated that "punitive damages are available against sec­
tion 1983 defendants when there are aggravating circumstances." Id at 1067. 
35. Id 
36. 453 U.S. at 255. The Court examined the defendant's failure to enter a timely 
objection under FED. R. Civ. P. 51 and the lack of plain error in the decision below, but 
felt that the "novelty" and need for determination of this issue required an "uncon­
stricted review" to promote the interests of justice and efficient judicial administration 
(even though the procedure was improper). Id at 257. 
37. Id at 271. 
38. Id The history and purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had previously 
been examined extensively in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), Monell v. New York 
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 
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that by 1871 there was a "settled common-law immunity"39 for mu­
nicipal corporations against punitive damages and, in the absence of 
a specific provision abrogating this immunity in the Civil Rights Act, 
the Court determined that this well-established immunity was in­
tended to be incorporated into the Act.40 
Further, the lack of extended legislative debate on section 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor to section 1983, 
prompted the Court to examine the legislative history of the Sher­
man amendment, a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act which 
would have held municipalities strictly liable for damage by riots or 
other violent assembly.41 The court determined that the rejection of 
this amendment, which would have explicitly required municipal 
governments to compensate those injured, implied that the 42d Con­
gress did not intend by its silence to impose liability upon municipal­
ities for punitive damages.42 
The Court also discussed the concerns voiced by some legisla­
tors in the debates over the Sherman amendment and articulated in 
some early cases establishing this immunity. These concerns 
stemmed from the beliefs that innocent taxpayers, who should bene­
fit from the example being set, were the people punished;43 that in­
nocent people were being unfairly punished for the acts of others;44 
and that an undue fiscal burden was being placed on cities.45 Be­
cause these concerns were embodied in cases arising prior to 1871, 
and were voiced by legislators in the debates surrounding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, the Court found no intention to abolish the mu­
nicipal immunity from punitive damages in cases brought under sec­
622 (1980), and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980) (dissenting opinion). The Court 
recognized from these cases that any review ofliability under section 1983 must include a 
consideration of the history and policy of the enactment. 453 U.S. at 266. 
39. 453 U.S. at 266. 
40. Id at 263 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967». 
41. Id. at 264. Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) are also cases in which the Court turned to 
examination of the proposed Sherman amendment due to limited legislative debate on 
§ I of the Civil Rights Act. The Sherman amendment was not an amendment to section 
I, now section 1983; rather, it was an additional section (§7) sought to be amended to the 
entire act. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666. 
42. 453 U.S. at 263-64. 
43. Id. at 261 (citing M'Gary v. President and Council of the City of Lafayette, 12 
Rob. 668, 677 (La. 1846». 
44. Id. at 261. Early cases also mentioned that corporations cannot be willful or 
malicious on their own and so should not be held liable for punitive damages for the acts 
of its officers. Id. at 261-62 (citing Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620 (1877». 
45. Id. at 263. 
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tion 1 of the ACt.46 
The Court also reviewed the general policy behind awards of 
punitive damages to decide whether such awards against local gov­
ernments would be beneficial in the context of section 1983.47 The 
retributive purpose of punitive damages was found by the Court to 
be hampered by allowing such awards against municipalities.48 Ret­
ribution was viewed by the Court to be of lesser importance than the 
compensatory or deterrent aspects of section 1983,49 but assessments 
of punitive damage awards against municipal governments were 
found also to lack the deterrent effect desired. 50 The Court, there­
fore, concluded that the purposes of punitive damage awards were 
not served by making municipalities available for such damages. 51 
Other public policy issues were also considered in Fact Con­
certs. The expanded liability under section 1983, enunciated by the 
Court in recent cases, 52 was reviewed. This expansion of the section 
1983 remedy, combined with the possibility of punitive damage 
awards, was seen by the Court as too great a burden for municipal 
governments to bear.53 In addition, the Court indicated that knowl­
edge by the jury of the unlimited taxing power of municipalities may 
prejudice their assessment of punitive damages and may result in 
excessive cost to the cities. 54 Thus, the Court concluded from its 
analysis of these public policy concerns, as well as its analysis of the 
46. Id. at 263-64. 
47. Id. at 266. 
48. Id. at 267. The Court stated that since the victim will be fully compensated 
and punitive damages are only a windfall to the plaintiff, innocent taxpayers should not 
have to pay this retribution through increased taxes. Id. Moreover, a municipality can 
only act through its officials. If one of these officials acts in a willful or malicious manner 
such that punitive or exemplary damages are justified, the Court theorized, the individ­
ual official should be punished, not the government or its citizens. Id. 
49. Id. at 268. 
50. Id. at 268-70. The Court did not believe that punitive damage awards based 
on the wealth of a municipality would deter individual officials from misconduct. Id. 
Officials may also be punished through discharge or through the polls, if elected, without 
the necessity of awarding punitive damages against the local government. Id. at 269-270. 
If punitive damages are appropriate, the Court reasoned, they should be assessed against 
the offending individual based on his financial resources, and not the city's, in order to 
effectively deter repeated violations. Id. at 270. 
51. Id. at 271. 
52. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980) (section 1983 applies to viola­
tions of federal statutes); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (good faith 
immunity not available to municipalities for constitutional violations); Monell v. New 
York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities subject to section 1983 
liability). 
53. 453 U.S. at 270. 
54. Id. at 270-71. See also infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
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policies behind section 1983 liability and punitive damage awards, 
that it would be contrary to public policy if punitive damages were 
awarded against municipalities in section 1983 actions.55 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Section 1983 
Enactment of section I of the Civil Rights Act, the predecessor 
to section 1983,56 was a broad congressional action5? taken to enforce 
the fourteenth amendment to protect citizens from deprivations of 
their civil rights. 58 It provides a federal remedy for individuals 
whose civil rights59 have been transgressed by acts of state and local 
officials.60 While no new rights were created, a federal remedial 
scheme was deemed necessary to preserve already existing rights.61 
A remedy under section 1983 was extended in Monroe v. Pape 62 
to unconstitutional acts by officials abusing the power conferred by 
their governmental duties as well as those acting within the scope of 
their official duties. The Monroe Court examined what was meant 
by "under color of state law" and whether a municipality was a 
55. 453 U.s. at 271. 
56. Originally enacted in response to violence and disruption by the Ku Klux 
Klan, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed during the Reconstruction era. Act of 
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1873) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(Supp. V 1981». 
57. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4 
(1980). 
58. 365 U.S. at 171. 
59. The original language of section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 protected 
rights "secured by the Constitution of the United States," but was revised in 1874 to 
protect rights "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States ...." Act of 
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1878) (currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1983 (Supp. V 1981». See generally Note, Developing Governmenlal Liahilily Under 42 
u.S.C § 1983,55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 n.4, 1215 n.68 (1971). Maine v. Thiboutot, 
448 U.S. I (1980), specifically extended the section 1983 cause of action to rights secured 
by federal statutes. Id at 4. But if. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981) (limiting Thihoutol if other remedies are made avail­
able by statute). 
60. The deprivation of the plaintiffs civil rights must be caused "under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory." 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1983. Proof that the deprivation occurred "under color of state law" is an element that 
must be shown along with the existence of a "protected right" in a section 1983 cause of 
action. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Monell v. New York Dept. 
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Note, Civil Rights Suils Againsl Slale and 
Local Governmenlal Entities and Officials: Rights ofAction, Immunilies, and Federalism, 
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 952-53 (1980). 
61. Note, supra note 60, at 952. See infra note 66 for the remedial purposes of 
section 1983. 
62. 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961); see generally Note, supra note 60, at 953. 
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"person" liable under section 1983.63 In so doing, the Court re­
viewed the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act in 1871 and the rejection of the proposed Sherman 
amendment.64 The Monroe Court's interpretation of the debates 
and history of section 1983 led to its decision that, while section 1983 
provides a remedy for civil rights violations caused by the use or 
misuse of state law, municipalities were not "persons" under section 
1983 and could not be held liable for civil rights violations.65 The 
Court found the purposes behind section 1983 were to remedy situa­
tions in which state law explicitly deprived citizens of rights or effec­
tively did so by the absence or inadequacy of its laws.66 The intent 
of the statute, however, was not viewed by the Monroe Court as suf­
ficiently broad to allow actions to be brought against 
municipalities.67 
Seventeen years later, in Monell v. New York Department ofSo­
cial Services ,68 the Supreme Court overruled Monroe to the extent 
that it had held municipalities immune from section 1983 suits.69 
The Monell Court re-examined the legislative history and congres­
sional debates on the Civil Rights Act and Sherman amendment, but 
derived a different conclusion than that reached by the Monroe 
Court. The Monell Court did not interpret the rejection of the Sher­
man amendment as demonstrating an intent to immunize municipal­
ities from civil rights suits.70 Rather, section I of the 1871 Act, the 
predecessor to section 1983, was viewed by the Monell Court as in­
63. 365 u.s. at 187, 191. 
64. fd. at 173-91; see supra text accompanying notes 41-42. For a discussion of the 
impropriety of the Court's use of the legislative history in Monroe, see Note, supra note 
59, at 1205-07 and Note, supra note 60, at 134-35. 
65. 365 U.S. at 184, 191. Monroe also clarified that the remedy in section 1983 was 
supplementary to any state remedy, id. at 184, and that the violation of plaintiff's civil 
rights did not have to be done with the specific intent to so violate them. fd. at 187. See 
Note, supra note 59, at 1203-04. 
66. 365 U.S. at 173-74. The specific remedial purposes of section 1983 were seen as 
overriding state laws that deprived citizens of federal rights, providing a federal remedy 
where state law was inadequate, and providing a supplementary federal remedy when 
theoretically adequate state remedies were not applied with an even hand. fd. See also 
Note, supra note 60, at 951 n.21. 
67. 365 U.S. at 187. The Court emphasized the rejection of the Sherman amend­
ment, the lack of constitutional power of the Congress to impose obligations on local 
governments, and the Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871), which does not mandate 
that municipalities be included in the definition of "person." 365 U.S. at 188-91. 
68. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
69. fd. at 663. 
70. fd. at 669-683. 
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tending a broad remedy for violations of federally protected rightS.71 
The Monel! Court reconsidered the Monroe Court interpretation of 
the term "person" and concluded that municipal corporations and 
other local governmental units were to be included within its scope.72 
Thus, the intent of the 42d Congress is now perceived as embracing 
municipalities in the ambit of section 1983 liability.73 Now, munici­
pal governments may be sued for "monetary, declaratory, or injunc­
tive relief where. . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's of­
ficers."74 These governmental units, as well as individual defend­
ants, may also be held liable for unconstitutional action stemming 
from the government's policy or custom, even though such custom 
may not be formally codified or approved.75 Local governments, 
however, may not be held liable for violations of civil rights based 
on a respondeat superior theory.76 Currently, section 1983 is seen as 
7 I. Id. at 685. 
72. The Court re-interpreted the meaning of some comments made during the 
1871 congressional debates and found the Monroe Court misapprehended them. Id. at 
699. The Court based its decision on examination of the common law rule as it existed in 
1871 that municipal corporations were to be treated as natural persons and were suable 
in federal court. Id. at 687-88. The definition of "person" in the Dictionary Act was also 
reconsidered and held to be applicable. Id. at 688-89. The Monroe Court's departure 
from prior practice by not distinguishing between school boards (which had been held 
liable) and municipalities, and its "encouragement" of civil rights violations by allowing 
municipalities to rely on their immunity were also held determinative. Id. at 695-99. 
73. Id. at 701. The Monell Court, unlike that in Monroe, seemed satisfied to im­
pose liability on municipal defendants in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary 
in the Civil Rights Act or any subsequent legislative action. Id. 
74. 436 U.S. at 690. 
75. Id. at 690-9 I. 
76. Id. at 694. The Court did not discuss any other types of immunity municipali­
ties might hold, other than immunity from liability on a respondeat superior basis, be­
cause the constitutional violations in Monell stemmed from official policy. Id. at 694-95. 
Federal courts allowed a good faith immunity for municipalities until Owen v. City of 
Independence,445 U.S. 622 (1980), abrogated this good faith defense for municipalities 
and their officers. The Owen Court examined the purposes of section 1983 in its determi­
nation that this immunity should be abrogated. Id. at 650-656. 
Other traditional, though limited immunities may be permitted to some extent by 
some federal courts, but the policies and purposes of section 1983 and the compatability 
of the immunity must be explored. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) 
(qualified immunity for prison officials); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (abso­
lute immunity for state prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified 
immunity for local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) 
(qualified immunity for governor and other state officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 
(1967) (absolute immunity for judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (quali­
fied immunity for legislators). Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (President 
entitled to absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982) (government 
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providing a remedy for violations of federally protected rights 
caused by official policy, whether or not written as law, and this stat­
ute must be construed broadly in order to be fully effective.77 
B. Punitive Damages 
Although section 1983 does not specify remedies for redressing 
violations of civil rights, it generally is agreed that injuries caused by 
the deprivation of civil rights are ameliorated through compensatory 
damage awards.78 In reaching this conclusion, courts have examined 
the purpose of section 1983.79 The goal of section 1983 is to protect 
injuries sustained due to violations of federally protected rights.80 
Compensation for injuries is the basic principle of damages devel­
oped by the common law of tortS.81 This common law rule of dam­
ages has been examined and found to be compatible with the 
purpose of section 1983.82 This suggests that, at the very least, the 
principle of compensation governs injuries caused by deprivation of 
civil rights. But "[t]his is not to say that exemplary or punitive dam­
ages might not be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the 
specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional 
rights."83 
officials acting in discretionary capacity entitled to qualified immunity). For an excellent 
discussion of the legislative history of section 1983 through Monell as well as the effect of 
Owen on immunities, see Comment, Owen v. City ofIndependence: Expanding the Scope 
of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517 (1981) and K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 25.00-3 to 25.00-4, 26.15 to 26.21, 26.22, 
questions 6, 7, 18 (Supp. 1982). 
77. 436 U.S. at 690-91. 
78. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978), and cases cited therein. 
79. Id at 254-55; Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
80. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. 
81. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956); see also Fisher 
v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965) (concerning damages under state tort 
law: "[T]he primary basis for an award of damages is compensation. That is, the objec­
tive is to make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his 
injury in terms of money." (emphasis in original». 
82. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,255-59 (1978) (stating that "[t]o the extent 
that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of consti­
tutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable 
than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages."); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. 
Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (stating that "[t]he fundamental goal embodied in the 
civil rights statutes of compensating aggrieved individuals for violations of their constitu­
tional rights is fulfilled by the availability of compensatory damages. . . . "). 
83. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978); accord Silver v. Cormier, 529 
F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976) (punitive damages may be awarded in "aggravating cir­
cumstances"); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Tr. for State Coli. of Conn.), 474 F.2d 485, 
489 (2d Cir. 1973) ("appropriate" § 1983 cases); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (evil intent standard); Basista v. Weir, 
204 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:193 
Punitive damages typically are awarded with the specific design 
of punishing the offending party and deterring others from commit­
ting like offenses.84 When more than compensatory or injunctive re­
lief seems warranted,85 punitive damages may be awarded against 
individual wrongdoers in section 1983 cases provided that the poli­
cies of punishment and deterrence are furthered. 86 
Most of the cases that have examined the issue agree, however, 
that, when punitive damages are assessed against a municipality 
rather than an individual or a private corporation, the rationale sup­
340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965) (federal law allows punitive damages; no standard 
mentioned). 
84. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971); see also 
Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 
So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 
1968); McClellan and N orthcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violations ofConstitutional 
Rights, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 409 (1980); see also Note, Punitive Damage LiabllilyofMunicipal 
Corporations in Pennsylvania, 84 DICK. L. REV. 267,274 (1979) (discussion of three dif­
ferent approaches to insulating municipalities from punitive damages including the 
"functional approach" of analyzing the purposes behind punitive damages and examin­
ing if these purposes are filled). 
85. Hild v. Bruner, 496 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (D. N.J. 1980). Varying standards are 
applied when determining when punitive damages are necessitated. In general, malice or 
reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights must be shown. Id at 100 ("The test is whether 
defendant acted with actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right 
or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing so."). 
Stolberg v. Board of Tr. for State Coli. of Conn., 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) also 
discussed the standards used to determine when punitive damages should be awarded in 
section 1983 cases: where willful or malicious violations of constitutional rights are 
proved; where a defendant has acted willfully and in gross disregard for plaintiffs rights; 
and where a defendant acted with knowledge of the violation of rights or with reckless 
disregard of plaintiffs rights. Id at 489, and cases cited therein. Other section 1983 
cases have applied different standards. E.g., Miller v. Apartments and Homes of N.J., 
Inc., 646 F.2d 101, III (3d Cir. 1981) (knowledge or reckless disregard, wanton miscon­
duct, wrongdoing by action or knowledgeable inaction, and authorizing, ratifying or fos­
tering the acts of violation); Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 
1977) (oppression, malice, gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, and reckless 
disregard for plaintiffs rights may justify punitive damages but vindication of personal 
pride is not the sort of malice usually punished in this way); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 
F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968) (evil intent standard), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1980); Manfre­
doni a V. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 773 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (bad faith, improper motive, and 
gross disregard for plaintiffs constitutional rights); Rzeznick V. Chief of Police of South­
ampton, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1489, 1492,407 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (violations 
of an individual's rights aggravated by actual malice, evil intent, deliberate oppression, 
wilful or wanton misconduct or reckless disregard). 
Whether or not the acts meet the applicable standard, and the amount of punitive 
damages awarded if the standard is met, is a question of fact left to the discretion of the 
trial judge or jury. Stolberg, 474 F.2d at 489; Rzeznick, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
1492,407 N.E.2d at 391. 
86. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d I, 321 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1975); 
accord Alicea Rosado V. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 1977). 
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porting punitive damages dissolves.8 ? Many suggest that in the ab­
sence of a statute specifically providing for punitive damages against 
a municipality, such damages should not be permitted.88 These 
cases are in general agreement that punitive damages against munic­
ipalities do not punish or deter the offender and may result in exces­
sive damage awards. The retributive purpose of punitive damages is 
not considered to be effectuated when assessed against municipalities 
because the taxpayers, and not the offender, bear the brunt of the 
punishment. It is the taxpayers who actually pay the damage award 
and would be punished as wrongdoers even though they are sup­
posed to benefit from the public example made of the wrongdoer. 89 
Deterrence is also not achieved by assessing punitive damages 
87. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d I, 10,321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975); 
Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 
423 S.W.2d 810,814 (Mo. 1968); Edmonds v. Dillon, 485 F. Supp. 722,730 (N.D. Ohio 
1980). See also Note, supra note 84, at 274, in which the author states: "Cases that 
follow the functional approach hold that an award of punitive damages against a munici­
pality would violate the basic punitive purpose behind the award." Id, and cases cited 
therein. But see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (stating that a 
city is considered a "person" for purposes of the federal antitrust laws, id at 394-97, 
which subjects them to liability for threefold damages if such laws are violated, id at 396 
n.13, although the Court did not decide the question of remedy in that case. Id at 402); 
Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978) (allowing punitive damages 
against municipality); Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 242 N.W.2d 494 (1976) 
(exemplary damages permitted against municipalities but not for punitive purposes); 
Note, supra note 84, at 281-85 (discussion of the view permitting punitive damages 
against a municipality). 
88. E.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City 
of Springfield, 423 S.W. 2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); see Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 
730 & n.8 (N.D. Ohio 1980). But see Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d 1,8,321 
N.E.2d 885, 890 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dissenting opinion) (punitive damages should be 
awarded against municipality unless statute specifically forbids); Note, supra note 84, at 
285 n.1O I, 296 (citing courts and commentators which advocate awards of punitive dam­
ages against municipalities, but concluding that in the absence of a clear statutory provi­
sion, courts should continue to prohibit these awards based on case law). 
89. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455,457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of 
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968). This idea is well stated in Note, supra note 
84, at 274: 
A municipal corporation is composed of innocent, tax-paying citizens. This 
group of tax-paying citizens is the same group that is supposed to benefit from 
the public example set by the punishment of the wrongdoer. Imposition of pu­
nitive damages on a municipal corporation places the burden of paying those 
damages upon the very group that the law seeks to protect through the addition 
of the extra measure of punishment intended by the award of punitive dam­
ages. . . . Since it would be 'absurd and illogical' to hold that punishment 
should be imposed upon the public, courts have declared such a position con­
trary to public policy, and have denied recovery of punitive damages from a 
municipal corporation. 
Id at 274-75 (footnotes omitted). 
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against municipal defendants. An award against the municipality 
may have little or no effect on the wrongdoing employee, through 
whom the municipality acts. This is true because the employee 
would not be able to pay such a large award if it were assessed 
against the employee individually or even if indemnification were 
sought by the city.90 These employees will not be deterred because 
they know their employer will pay the costs of their wrongdoing.91 
Appropriate alternatives are available, however, to discipline 
wrongdoing employees without recourse to punitive damage awards 
against a municipal employer.92 For example, some municipal em­
ployees might be accountable to the electorate and therefore could 
be punished through the electoral process.93 It has been suggested 
that if punitive damages are to be awarded, they should be based on 
the employee's financial resources and not the city's, to be a true 
mechanism of deterrence.94 
Another reason given for the blanket prohibition against puni­
tive damage awards against municipalities is the prejudicial effect 
the unlimited taxing power of a municipality will have on the jury.95 
Since evidence of the wealth of a tortfeasor generally is admissible to 
help determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded,96 
and a city's wealth virtually is unlimited when its taxing power is 
considered,97 juries may be more likely to award huge amounts of 
punitive damages. If the wealth of the defendant were not admitted 
as evidence, the jury could not determine an amount adequate to 
punish the city and the retributive element of these types of awards 
would be removed.98 In addition, while there is a general rule that 
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the amount of 
90. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Note, supra note 84, at 
275. 
91. Note, supra note 84, at 275. The deterrent effect of these punitive damage 
awards against one municipality also will not necessarily have a deterrent impact on 
other municipal corporations. ld at 276. 
92. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. City of 
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); Note, supra note 84, at 276. 
93. Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968). 
94. Note, supra note 84, at 276 n.46. The cosf of compensation, if assessed against 
the individual at trial or by indemnification, may be sufficient to deter as well. 
95. See, e.g. , Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Chappell v. 
City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 
Ohio 2d I, 8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975). 
96. See, e.g., Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d I, 8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 
(1975); Note, supra note 84, at 277. 
97. Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio 2d I, 8,321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975). 
98. Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 SO.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965). The punishment ele­
ment would not be served because only a small award is necessary to punish a poor man 
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the compensatory damages awarded, this has never effectively pre­
vented excessive punitive damage awards.99 The effect of the jury's 
knowledge of a municipality's unlimited taxing power continues to 
have an impact on the decision that such awards are contrary to pub­
lic policy.100 
To summarize, the theory supporting punitive damage awards 
in section 1983 actions suggests that such damages may be assessed 
against municipalities, over and above compensatory damages, if 
such need is demonstrated and if the purposes of punishment and 
deterrence are served. Such damages, however, have not tradition­
ally been permitted against municipalities because, in practice, they 
neither deter nor punish, and are often excessive. This traditional 
majority rule prohibiting punitive damages from municipalities 
prompted the Fact Concerts decision,101 thereby creating a definitive 
immunity from punitive damages for municipal defendants in sec­
tion 1983 suits brought in federal courts. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Effect of Fact Concerts 
Potentially, there are section 1983 cases that warrant punitive 
damages against municipal defendants, but the inability to promote 
the policy behind punitive damages militates against the award of 
such damages. 102 Fact Concerts renders it impossible for the piaintiff 
in a section 1983 case to receive punitive damage awards when the 
defendant is a local governmental unit, even if the state law frees 
municipalities from the traditional prohibition against punitive 
damages. 103 
but more is necessary to punish a rich man. State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 67, 579 P.2d 
568, 571 (1976). 
99. Note, supra note 84, at 277-78. 
100. It has also been suggested that the potential for large punitive damage awards 
contradicts public policy because it would be another "financial burden[] addled] to the 
specter of financial ruin already facing some cities." Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 
722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
101. 453 U.S. at 263-64. 
102. These may be cases in which the only damages truly available to the injured 
party are punitive, and compensation for the deprivation of the rights involved amounts 
to very little in monetary terms. Eg., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). It remains 
important in these cases for the defendant to be punished and deterred for depriving the 
plaintiff of these rights. 
103. The plaintiff cannot now receive the damages he or she might have received 
prior to Fact Concerts because courts applying the majority rule prohibiting punitive 
damages against municipalities often made exceptions to that rule and allowed punitive 
damages against municipal governments in extraordinary circumstances or where the 
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Although Fact Concerts made a distinction between individual 
defendants and municipal defendants in section 1983 claims, it is un­
clear if such a distinction is effective. For example, the deterrent 
purpose of such damage awards may not be served if individual de­
fendants are indemnified against such judgments, 104 just as munici­
palities are not deterred because the damage award may be paid 
merely by raising taxes. Thus, neither individuals nor municipal de­
fendants may be deterred or punished and the general purposes of 
punitive damages are therefore not effectuated. 
In addition, the Court has overlooked the fact that individual 
defendants may be judgment-proof, and if the case is such that puni­
tive damages are the bulk of the award, the plaintiff may again be 
victimized. The purpose of a section 1983 cause of action to redress 
those deprived of their civil rights,105 is not fulfilled by such a result. 
The distinction between individual and municipal defendants, there­
fore, also is not efficacious in serving any of the goals enunciated by 
the Court. 
Subsequent to Fact Concerts, courts have disallowed or reversed 
the punitive damages assessed against municipal defendants for vio­
lations of civil rights in suits brought under section 1981,106 section 
1982,107 and section 1983.108 Thus, plaintiffs in situations in which 
citizens or superior officers of the municipality ratified or authorized the violative con­
duct. See Note, supra note 84, at 281-83. This inability for a plaintiff to recover at all 
may even seem to some municipal employees as a sign of condonation to deprive people 
of those rights for which little compensation may be had. 
104. Some municipalities indemnify their employees in cases where the actions 
complained of arose within the scope of the employee's duties. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West Supp. 
1982). Because the acts complained of in section 1983 actions must arise "under color of 
state law," it is likely that many individual defendants in such cases will be seen as acting 
within the scope of their duties and so will be indemnified ifthe local statute so provides. 
105. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
106. Heritage Homes v. Seekonk Water District, 670 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1982) (used 
Fact Concerts' rationale for § 1981 claim stating this was not one of those situations 
where taxpayers themselves were malicious and should be punished, although facts of 
case suggest it was such a case, and court below suggested that there was "open participa­
tion" by taxpayers, 648 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1981)}; Tyler v. Board of Education of 
New Castle County, 519 F. Supp. 834, 837 (D. Del. 1981) (reasoning in Fact Concerts 
applies to school districts); Ferguson v. Joliet Mass Transit District, 526 F. Supp. 222 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (reasoning in Fact Concerts used for § 1981 case). But see Boyd v. Shaw­
nee Mission Public Schools, 522 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Kan. 1981) (reasoning of Fact Con­
certs not applicable to school district in § 1981 claim). 
107. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (overruling 
Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973) which held municipalities liable for 
punitive damages with respect to § 1982). 
108. Ray v. City of Edmond, 662 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1981); Gonzales v. City of 
Peoria, 537 F. Supp. 793 (D. Ariz. 1982); Bornhoff v. White, 526 F. Supp. 488 (D. Ariz. 
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punitive damages against a municipality seem warranted or neces­
sary, must either bypass Fact Concerts, 109 or urge that it be distin­
guished. 110 Given the broad rule laid down in Fact Concerts, 
however, which effectively bestowed immunity upon municipalities 
against punitive damages in many types of civil rights cases, III it is 
improbable that the case will be distinguished easily.1l2 Nonethe­
less, punitive damage awards forbidden by Fact Concerts may be 
attainable through use of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 113 and pendent 
jurisdiction. I 14 
B. Section 1988 
A state law that abrogates municipal immunity from punitive 
damages may be beneficial to a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 
claim against a municipality or other local governmental unit in a 
federal court because section 1988115 may permit use of state reme­
dial measures where remedies under the federal statute are 
insufficient. 
Section 1988 recognizes that the federal laws governing viola­
tions of civil rights may not be "adapted to" or may be "deficient in 
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of­
fenses...."116 It directs the courts to use "the common law, as 
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the state 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such . . . cause is held" as 
1981); Peters v. Township of Hopewell. 534 F. Supp. 1324 (D.N.J. 1982); DiGiovanni v. 
City of Philadelphia. 531 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tolbert v. County of Nelson. 527 
F. Supp. 836 (W.O. Va. 1981). 
109. See infra notes 115-199 and accompanying text. 
110. For example. the court in Black v. Stephens. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981) dis­
tinguished Fact Concerts and awarded punitive damages against a municipality based 
solely on a procedural difference. Id at 184 n.1. Black seems to represent the Third 
Circuit's manifestation of its disagreement with the Fact Concerts' outcome because the 
procedural difference upon which it was distinguished was extremely slight. Also. it 
appears that Black was a vehicle for disagreement with the Supreme Court because. as 
pointed out in the dissent in Black. the punitive damages issue was not even briefed in 
the court below and need not have been discussed on appeal. Id at 205 (Garth. J .• 
dissenting). It is not likely. however. that other courts will follow Black or so quickly 
distinguish the Supreme Court decision in Fact Concerts on such limited procedural 
differences. 
III. 453 U.S. at 271. 
112. But see Black v. Stephens. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Fact 
Concerts). 
113. 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 115-155 and accom­
panying text. 
114. 453 U.S. at 253 n.6. See infra notes 157-199 and accompanying text. 
115. 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
116. Id 
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long as these state laws are "not inconsistent" with federal laws and 
the Constitution. I 17 The key elements to demonstrating that section 
1988 should be used are a deficiency in the federal law, consistency 
between the state law to be applied and the underlying policies of the 
federal civil rights statute,118 and uniformity with the remedial 
scheme presented by the federal statute. 
1. Deficiency of the Federal Statute 
It is difficult to determine what is meant by "deficiency" of the 
remedial provisions of the federal statutes, although that is what sec­
tion 1988 was designed to alleviate. 1I9 Clearly, a federal law is not 
deficient solely because a state law is more favorable to the plain­
tiff; 120 this is a federal policy and should not be nullified by use of 
the state law by the plaintiff. 121 
Silence of the federal law as to an important issue, however, has 
been interpreted as a deficiency. 122 If the governing statute is silent 
117. Id. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by 
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title 
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil 
rights and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity 
with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the 
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish 
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitu­
tion and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil 
or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Consti­
tution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to govern the said courts 
in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the 
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 
Id. In 1976, section 1988 was amended to provide for attorney's fees in civil rights ac­
tions. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 
2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981). 
118. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Moor v. County of Alameda, 
411 U.S. 693 (1973); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1961). BUI see Eisenberg, Slale Law in Federal Civil Righls Cases: The 
Proper Scope 0/Seclion 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980) (contending that this inter­
pretation of section 1988 is correct and analyzing it in a fresh light based on the legisla­
tive history of section 1988, not the language). 
119. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,588 (1978). 
120. Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661,665 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Robertson 
v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability 
Under 42 u.S.C § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1971) (discussing the effects of 
interpreting the law as deficient if it fails to produce the desired result). 
121. Note, supra note 120, at 1218. 
122. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (§ 1983 silent as to survival of 
civil rights actions); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (§ 1983 silent as to 
survival of civil rights actions); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) 
211 1983) 	 OBTAINING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
on an issue a party wishes to pursue, at first glance it might appear 
that the state law may be used. 123 The simple and oft-cited test of 
Brazier v. Cherry 124 illustrates the idea that state law may be utilized 
easily whenever the federal statute is found inadequate in some way: 
What is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the 
civil rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that inquiry is 
then matched against (a) federal law and if it is found wanting the 
court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To whatever 
extent (b) helps, it is automatically available. . . . I25 
Because section 1983 is silent on the issue of damages, it may seem 
under the Brazier test, that a state law allowing punitive damages 
against municipalities may be applied. Section 1983, however, may 
not be viewed as being silent on the issue of punitive damages be­
cause Fact Concerts added a gloss to the statute in that it forbids 
these damages against municipal defendants. In addition, an ele­
ment of inconsistency, not mentioned in the Brazier test, is extremely 
important. 126 Even if silence is considered a deficiency, and the fed­
eral law is "found wanting,"127 the state law is not necessarily 
available. 
2. 	 Consistency of State Law with Policies Behind the 
Federal Statute 
Even if the federal statute is deemed deficient, the relevant state 
law may not be available because, as stated in Robertson v. 
Wegmann,128 the state statute is "the principal reference point" but 
is "subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied 
(§ 1982 silent as to remedies); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979); U.S. ex 
rei Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1969) 
(§ 1981 silent as to damage remedies); see also Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 508-15. 
123. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 118, at SIS (''tests for deficiency ... that tum solely 
on the study of federal statutes ... thrust [courts) towards state law without regard to the 
propriety of the state rule and without regard to whether a federal rule would be more 
appropriate"). 
124. 	 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961). 
125. Id. at 409. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D. 
Ala. 1981); U.S. ex rei Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1279, 
1282 and n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
126. E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("[I)n no case 
brought to this Court's attention has a state law remedy been allowed a plaintiff under 
§ 1981 el seq. when that state law remedy was inconsistent with the remedial scheme 
established by the federal statute.") 
127. 	 Brazier, 293 F.2d at 409. 
128. 	 436 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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when it is 'inconsistent. . .''' with federal law. 129 The policies of the 
federal law must therefore be examined to determine whether the 
state law is inconsistent with these federal policies. l3O 
The Court in Robertson found that the policies underlying sec­
tion 1983 were "compensation of persons injured by deprivation of 
federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting 
under color of state law."l31 
A federal court, accepting the underlying policies of section 
1983 as articulated in Robertson, might find that an award of puni­
tive damages against a municipal government was inconsistent with 
the policy behind section 1983 based on the Court's decision in Fact 
Concerts to prohibit such damages in a section 1983 cause of ac­
tion. 132 This is likely since the Fact Concerts Court analyzed the 
policies of section 1983 before deciding that punitive damages 
against municipalities would be inconsistent with that federal law. 133 
A court applying this analysis is likely to conclude that an inconsis­
tency remains even though a state has decided its local governmental 
129. Id at 589-90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
130. Id at 590. See also Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 663 (N.D. 
Ala. 1981); accord Kates & Kouba, Liability ofPublic Entities Under Section 1983 ofthe 
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 157 (1972); see generally Eisenberg, supra note 
1I8, at 518-521. 
131. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591. See also supra notes 56-76 and accompanying 
text. The Robertson Court determined that the state survival statutes at issue were not 
inconsistent with these policies. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592. See Brown v. Morgan 
County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (N.D. Ala. 1981). 
132. Cf Wilcher v. Gain, 31I F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970). This case was de­
cided prior to Monell and rejected municipal liability on the basis of Monroe, although 
the state law allowed it. The state law was considered inconsistent with the federal policy 
delineated in Monroe. 311 F. Supp. at 755. This situation is similar to Fact Concerts. 
Courts may reject the idea of punitive damage assessments against municipalities even if 
state law allowed them because of the inconsistency with the federal rule laid out in Fact 
Concerts prohibiting such damages. But see Kates & Kouba, supra note 130, at 160-61. 
The authors of that 1972 article suggest that Wilcher was decided wrongly and was "slav­
ish adherence to precedent." Id at 161. They urge that the policy of section 1983 must 
be reinterpreted when examined together with section 1988. They state that, when taken 
together, the policies of section 1983 and section 1988 may permit use of the state law, 
especially when application of a state law which allows what the federal cases prohibit 
has not been discussed. Id at 157, 160. 
Federal courts could be urged to consider the policies of section 1988 together with 
section 1983 under applicable state laws allowing punitive damages against municipali­
ties since section 1988 was not mentioned in Fact Concerts. If successful, a court may 
decide that the federal law must take the municipalities as it finds them; if punitive dam­
ages may be awarded against them under state law, then this state law should be recog­
nized, through section 1988, in a section 1983 cause of action in a federal court. 
133. See supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text. 
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units may be penalized. 134 
In Miller v. Apartments and Homes of New Jersey, Inc. ,135 the 
Third Circuit applied an even farther reaching analysis to determine 
whether state or federal law should be used. Initially, the court de­
scribed the "interstitial character" of federal law as asserted by Pro­
fessor Hart. 136 The court then described the process which 
determines whether to fill an interstice with federal common law or 
state law as an analysis involving: the congressional purpose and the 
underlying goals of a statute; the extent to which the application of 
federal law would further those goals or the application of state law 
would impede them; and the traditional allocation of functions be­
tween state and federal law. 137 
Although the Robertson analysis 138 seems to inhere in the Miller 
test, a plaintiff might prefer the more extensive test enunciated in 
Miller. Under this test, as under the traditional Robertson test, a 
plaintiff may urge that the congressional intent was not to disallow 
punitive damages to be assessed against municipalities but that the 
meaning of the silence on this issue is, from section 1988, that state 
law should prevail. The statute's silence may also be interpreted as 
meaning that any remedy necessary to vindicate plaintiff's rights, if 
allowed by state law, is permitted. 139 The goals behind section 1983 
have previously been determined to be to compensate and deter civil 
rights violations. 140 It is improbable that federal courts would accept 
much variance in the statement of these goals if offered by a plaintiff. 
These courts may not view the goal of compensation as being served 
by the award of punitive damages against municipalities, even if the 
state allowed it. 141 Compensatory damages are not impeded and pu­
nitive damages are paid above and beyond the costs of compensa­
tion. The goal of deterrence may be fulfilled, however, if the state's 
goal in permitting punitive damages in these cases is also to deter. 
134. The state courts or legislatures are unlikely to have specifically addressed the 
federal statutes governing violations of civil rights in their decisions to allow assessments 
of punitive damages against municipalities. 
135. 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981). 
136. Id. at 105. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART 
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 756-832 (2d ed. 
1973). 
137. 646 F.2d at 107. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130. 
139. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969). 
140. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Monell v. Dept. of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
141. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981). 
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Finally, under the Miller analysis, a plaintiff must show that re­
medial statutes are not traditionally more a federal concern than a 
state concern. This may be demonstrated by the fact that section 
1983 is a federal statute, silent as to remedies, and section 1988, 
which refers to section 1983, directs courts to use state law. 142 More­
over, it has been stated that remedies are more suited to "statutory 
rather than judicial solution"143 and a plaintiff may argue that the 
applicable codified state law should be applied rather than the fed­
eral common law. l44 
Under the Miller analysis, therefore, a plaintiff is able to better 
demonstrate that a state law permitting punitive damage awards 
against municipal defendants is not fundamentally inconsistent with 
section 1983 and the other civil rights statutes. The extensive inter­
pretations already given by the Court regarding municipal liabil­
ity'45 and punitive damages,'46 however, make the chances appear 
slight that federal courts will accept state laws that impinge on these 
interpretations. Such laws are likely to be considered inconsistent 
with section 1983 whether viewed under the traditional Robertson or 
the enhanced Miller test. 
3. Uniformity 
Uniformity of the federal remedial scheme is another obstacle 
that must be overcome when petitioning for use of state law by the 
provisions of section 1988. Many cases point out that Congress 
could not have intended for remedies to vary from state to state be­
cause the purposes of the statute would not be fully effective. 147 
Some courts seem to interpret section 1988 as directing the use of 
federal common law, but then label the state law or the rule that 
142. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text; if. Middlesex County Sewer­
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. I (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part) (no express remedy or comprehensive remedial scheme plus intent of section 1988 
shows a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies). 
143. 646 F.2d at 107. 
144. Statutes of limitations and other state statutory matters have been applied. 
E.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law ofcontri­
bution); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (Georgia survival 
statute used). 
145. E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. New 
York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
146. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
147. E.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 
F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1961); Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
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court wishes to apply the federal common law. 148 On the other 
hand, section 1988 has also been said to mean that "both federal and 
state rules or damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the 
policies expressed in the federal statutes."149 This suggests that vari­
ance between states may have been intended by enacting section 
1988. The majority of courts, however, emphasize a uniform reme­
dial scheme or a federal common law of remedies for civil rights 
violations, rather than allowing different state laws to be applied. 150 
Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to apply state law authorizing punitive 
damages against municipalities may not be successful because the 
application of such a law would not result in a uniform remedial 
scheme. 
As the foregoing analysis indicates, it is unlikely that the appli­
cation of section 1988 will realistically aid a plaintiff who is pursuing 
punitive damages from a municipality for violation of civil rights, 
even when state law provides for such damages. To successfully use 
section 1988, the requirements of its three-part test must be fulfilled. 
Failure to obtain punitive damages from the defending government 
may not be deemed a deficiency. Though section 1983 is silent as to 
available remedies, compensatory damages remain available. 151 Ad­
ditionally, Fact Concerts has filled the silence of section 1983 on the 
issue of punitive damage and has prohibited them against municipal 
defendants. Awards of punitive damages may be considered incon­
sistent with the federal statutory plan as implied by the Fact Con­
certs rule prohibiting damages of this type. 152 Moreover, awards of 
148. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 256 (1969) (dissenting opin­
ion); Note, supra note 120, at 1221; Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 518-521. 
149. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969). 
150. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 147. 
151. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text. 
152. See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. This unsuccessful result 
seems likely even though section 1988 has been described as "responsive ... whenever a 
federal right is impaired," Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969), and 
"sweeping ... [,) reftect[ing) ... that the redress available will effectuate the broad 
policies of the civil rights statutes," Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1961); 
if. Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 499-500 (The lack of success of such an attempt is due to 
a misunderstanding of § 1988's true purpose and inconsistent interpretations of § 1988 by 
the Supreme Court.). 
The failure of the section 1988 strategy may also be predicted due to the lack of 
success of cases seeking to use section 1988 to permit liability of a municipality prior to 
Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
Bul see Kates & Kouba, supra note 130, at 160-61 and supra note 132, (contending that 
Wilcher was decided wrongly); Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1980) (allowing 
contribution under state law by § 1988); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 
(N.D. Ala. 1981) (allowing state survival statute under § 1988). See generally Brennan, 
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punitive damages based on state law would cause lack of uniform 
remedies for violation of civil rights governed by section 1983. 153 Al­
though section 1988 suggests that state law may be used, a plaintiff 
seeking su~h damages is likely to fare better in state court l54 or by 
bringing the state claims in federal court with the federal section 
1983 claim.155 
C. Pendent Jurisdiction 
It may not be necessary for a plaintiff in a section 1983 claim to 
separate claims between state and federal courts or to bring suit only 
in state court to obtain punitive damages against a municipal de­
fendant. The Fact Concerts Court did not address the issue of pen­
dent jurisdiction but left it open. 156 Therefore, if a plaintiff chooses 
to bring the civil rights action in a federal court, the prohibition 
against punitive damage awards from municipalities may be over­
come by joining the state claim that allows punitive damages against 
a municipality with the federal section 1983 claim under the doctrine 
of pendent jurisdiction. 
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is a judicial creation, al­
lowing federal courts to assert jurisdiction over certain claims or par­
ties which are outside the congressional mandate of power given 
federal courts. 157 The tests to be applied to determine if pendent ju­
risdiction may be invoked have evolved slowly and this evolution 
has created an intricate and complex structure which is often mis­
construed. It is therefore necessary to examine the basic structure of 
pendent jurisdiction before discussing its application to section 1983 
litigation. 158 
State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) 
(encouraging use of state constitutions and law where more protective of civil rights). 
153. State legislatures which have determined on their own that punitive damages 
may be assessed against municipalities in their state will not be given credence in a fed­
eral court, although it appears that no financial burden is placed on unprepared or dis­
abled municipalities if the state has so provided. Note, supra note 120, at 1221-22. 
154. Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 ac­
tions. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1,36 n.17 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
155. See infra notes 157-199 and accompanying text. 
156. 453 U.S. at 254 n.6. 
157. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3567 at 439-62 (1975 and Cum. Supp. 1980). U.S. CONST. art. Ill, 
§ 2, cl. 2, empowers Congress to ascertain jurisdiction of the federal courts. A claim or 
party is outside the jurisdiction of a federal court if there is a lack of diversity or insuffi­
cient amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.c. § 1332 (1976). 
158. This discussion utilizes the structure of pendent jurisdiction as set out, simply 
and notably, in A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancl1/ary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of 
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1. The Structure of Pendent Jurisdiction 
The early rule, defining the scope of pendent jurisdiction, was 
enunciated prior to the institution of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure and stated that state and federal claims could be brought to­
gether in federal court if they stemmed from the same cause of 
action. 159 Because this test was eventually found to be repugnant to 
the policy of liberal joinder of claims and parties as propounded by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure160 and was difficult to apply, it 
was replaced by a two-part test created in United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs. 161 
The first aspect of the Gibbs test is based on the constitutional 
power given to federal courtS. 162 A state claim may be appended to 
a federal claim if the federal claim is substantial and both claims 
arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact" and should be tried 
in one proceeding such that they are considered to comprise one con­
stitutional case. 163 The Gibbs Court, however, sharply curtailed the 
ability to add claims through this constitutional power by holding 
that federal courts always have discretion to dismiss any state claims 
a plaintiff seeks to add. l64 If judicial economy, convenience or fair­
ness are not served, or if jury confusion is prevented, the state claim 
may be dismissed, even though the court has "power" over the 
case. 165 
The other factors considered in determining whether to assert 
pendent jurisdiction deal generally with examination of the relevant 
jurisdictional statute. 166 The factors in this examination include con­
gressional intent, the posture of the parties, and the difference be-
Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Incidental Ju­
risdiction ]. 
The author of that article uses the term "incidental jurisdiction" to cover both pen­
dent and ancillary jurisdiction. Since what has come to be known as ancillary jurisdic­
tion is unlikely to be sought in the context discussed here, only pendent jurisdiction is 
mentioned. 
159. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933). 
160. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see also FED. R. 
CIv. P. 14, 18, 20. 
161. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
162. Id. at 725. 
163. Id. The term "one Case" refers to article III of the United States Constitution. 
164. fd. at 726. 
165. Id. The courts are also directed to examine whether the case involves a sub­
stantial federal question or whether the state claims predominate. 
166. See Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1939-46. See also Aldinger v. 
Howard, 427 U.S. I (1976); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 
(1978). 
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tween joining a claim or a party. 167 
In Aldinger v. Howard,168 a plaintiff, in a pre-Monell 169 section 
1983 action, sought to impose liability upon a county.l7O Counties 
and other local governments were not, by the then-current interpre­
tation, intended to be held liable under section 1983 nor under the 
statute govemingjurisdiction over civil rights cases.l7l TheAldinger 
Court stated that permitting the state claim to be used would violate 
congressional intent behind the jurisdictional statute. 172 Generally, 
the state claim may not be added if it causes the jurisdiction of the 
relevant statute to be asserted over claims or parties not intended to 
be covered by that statute. 173 
The Court, however, in Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. 
Kroger 174 stated that, in addition to examining the congressional in­
tent of a jurisdictional statute, the posture of the parties must be 
taken into account. 175 The Kroger Court would not defeat the con­
gressional intent of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction, 
which had been interpreted as requiring complete diversity,176 when 
the party who chose the federal forum sought to assert pendent juris­
diction over a claim. 177 The Court suggested, however, that a party 
in federal court involuntarily might be permitted to add a state 
claim, even if it seemed contrary to the language of the jurisdictional 
statute. 178 The question of which party chose the federal forum and 
whether that party was in an offensive or defensive position is there­
fore important to the pendent jurisdiction analysis. 
The issue of whether a party or a claim is sought to be joined 
167. Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1941. 
168. 427 U.S. I (1976). 
169. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 68-76. 
170. 427 U.S. at 4-5. 
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
172. 427 U.S. at 18-19. 
173. This pertains to all jurisdictional statutes; e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal 
question), 1332 (diversity) & 1343 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Owen Equipment & Erec­
tion Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("The limits upon federal jurisdiction, 
whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor 
evaded."). 
174. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
175. Id at 373; see generally Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1940, 1943­
45. 
176. 437 U.S. at 372 (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)). 
177. Id at 374 (the plaintiff may not complain and must accept the limitations of 
the federal court if plaintiff chose to bring suit there). 
178. Id at 375-76. For example, a defendant or impleaded party or a plaintiff in 
an action removed from state court would all be in federal court involuntarily. 
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through pendent jurisdiction was also considered in Aldinger .179 The 
Aldinger Court implied that adding a party may violate the power 
given the federal courts more than adding a claim. ISO It was sug­
gested that it would be unfair, as well as being beyond the courts' 
statutory authority, to assert jurisdiction over a party over whom no 
independent basis of jurisdiction existed. lSI The Court noted that it 
was not as unseemly to allow parties already facing each other in a 
federal dispute to litigate one more claim.ls2 
2. 	 Application of the Pendent Jurisdiction Doctrine to 
Section 1983 Litigation 
The matter of whether a state claim or party is sought to be 
added, the posture of the parties, and the congressional intent of the 
jurisdictional statute must be considered by a federal court in the 
decision of whether to assert jurisdiction, as well as whether the 
court has power over the claim or party. The final decision of assert­
ing pendent jurisdiction over a state claim remains, of course, within 
the discretion of the federal court. Therefore, a plaintiff in a section 
1983 action who seeks pendent jurisdiction of a state claim which 
allows punitive damages against a municipality must take all of 
these factors into account. 
The constitutional prerequisites enunciated in the Gibbs power 
test are likely to be fulfilled since the section 1983 claim will be con­
sidered a substantial federal question, provided that the claim is not 
fabricated, and the facts of the state claim are likely to stem from the 
same operative facts causing violation of the plaintiffs rights. ls3 The 
claims should, therefore, be tried in one lawsuit and are one case. 
While a court always has the discretion to dismiss a pendent state 
claim, it also seems that the interests of convenience, judicial econ­
omy and fairness are served if the state claim is allowed to be de­
179. 	 427 U.S. at 14-15. 
180. Id at IS, 18. See Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 158, at 1946. The article 
states that more practical difficulties and procedural burdens arise when a party is added 
than when a claim is added. Adding a claim involves just another dispute between the 
parties already involved; judicial economy and convenience, tools of discretion, are not 
compromised as they are by the addition of a party. Id It is for this reason that it may 
be argued, alternatively, that this factor of adding a claim or party is really a part of the 
Gibbs discretion test. 
181. 	 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14. 
182. 	 Id 
183. But see, e.g., Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 682 (D.C. Pa. 
1978) (court decided pendent state claims against city although section 1983 claim 
improper). 
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cided with the federal section 1983 claim. 184 
Examination of the congressional intent behind the jurisdic­
tional statute governing civil rights,185 however, may indicate that 
Congress did not intend this type of state claim to be appended. Be­
cause Fact Concerts determined that the 42d Congress did not intend 
for punitive damages to be assessed against a municipality in civil 
rights actions,186 a court may determine that the congressional intent 
behind the jurisdictional statute governing civil rights actions was to 
disallow claims seeking this type of damages to be added by pendent 
jurisdiction. 187 
The statute governing general federal question jurisdiction, 188 
however, is also applicable to section 1983 cases. The congressional 
intent behind this statute, especially since the amount in controversy 
has been eliminated,189 is to encourage federal question cases to be 
heard in federal courtS.190 Rather than forcing the plaintiff to bring 
the section 1983 action, a federal question, to the state court for the 
state claim to be adjudicated, federal courts may allow the claim to 
be added to determine the federal question fully, as Congress seems 
to have intended. 191 
184. Juries would not be confused by the addition of a punitive damages claim and 
the federal question (§ 1983) would still predominate. Any existing confusion on the part 
of the jury may be detected through use of special verdicts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49. 
185. 28 U.S.c. § 1343 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
186. 453 U.S. at 271. 
187. C;: Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17. An analogous situation was involved in 
Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). In Morton, the Court determined that 
the congressional intent of the federal statute governing secondary boycotts, section 303 
of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.c. § 187 (1976), which provides for actions to 
recover "damages ... sustained," id , was to displace state law which might provide for 
other than actual, compensatory damages. Morton, 377 U.S. at 260-61. The Court's 
interpretation of the congressional intent of this statute effectively forbade the exercise of 
pendent jurisdiction over state claims seeking punitive damages based on state law. Id 
at 257. 
188. 28 U.S.c. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
189. 28 U.S.c. § 1331(a)(1976) was amended December I, 1980 by Pub. L. No. 96­
486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980), which struck out the amount in controversy requirement 
for federal question cases. The amended jurisdictional statute is codified at 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1331 (Supp. V 1981). 
190. North Dakota v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 373-74 (1980) 
(elimination of the amount in controversy for federal question cases demonstrates that 
Congress considered these suits important and pendent parties and claims intertwined 
with these cases should not be excluded); Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 
1981) (pendent jurisdiction exercised in section 1983 cases grounded on expansive scope 
of section 1331 as amended); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 
1978) (court has power to hear pendent claims in section 1983 case based on section 1331 
but court, in its discretion, declined to exercise this power). 
191. See, e.g., Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981). 
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The fact that the addition of a claim is being sought, and not the 
addition of a party, demonstrates that there is no great burden being 
placed on the defendant or on the courts.192 Because few impedi­
ments are being added, the state claim should be permitted to be 
litigated with the federal one. 193 The offensive party, the plaintiff, is 
attempting to append the claim, however. If the plaintiff initially 
brought the suit in federal court, the court may require the claim to 
be brought separately in state court since that forum is available and 
federal jurisdiction is not exclusive. 194 This result, though, might un­
dermine the congressional intent of vindicating federal claims in fed­
eral court 195 and the state claim should be permitted in federal 
court. 196 If the case were removed, plaintiff is not in federal court 
voluntarily, and the state claim should be heard. 197 
The above analysis suggests that plaintiffs may utilize the doc­
trine of pendent jurisdiction when seeking to recover punitive dam­
ages against a municipality under applicable state law in a section 
1983 claim. Other section 1983 cases seeking to assert pendent juris­
diction over other types of claims have been successful. 198 A section 
1983 case seeking to add a state claim permitting punitive damages 
against a municipal defendant should attain the same result. 199 
192. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14, 18; if. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376. 
193. North Dakota v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 371-74 (1980) 
(pendent jurisdiction asserted over state claim against new party). 
194. See supra note IS4. The Supreme Court has observed that concern for judi­
cial economy is not as great where "the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available 
without question in the state courts." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at IS (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. 
v. Fred Whittaker Co., SI2 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972)); see also Kroger, 437 U.S. at 
376. 
19S. Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note IS8, at 19S0. 
196. Courts' discretionary power may also be pursued. Courts may recognize that 
even though the plaintiff is in an offensive posture, it is only fair to try all the claims 
together. 
197. Again, the discretionary power of the court may playa part. The court may 
find it unfair to force a plaintiff who originally brought suit in state court to bear the 
burden, financial and otherwise, of bringing this claim in state court while litigating the 
original claim in the federal court. 
198. E.g., Brown v. Morgan County, SI8 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (survivor­
ship claims); if. Miley v. Oppenheimer and Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318 (Sth Cir. 1981) (puni­
tive damages permitted through pendent state claim in a case brought under Rule IOb-S 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(pendent jurisdiction over state claim allowing punitive damages in a case brought under 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule IOb-S). 
199. Pre-Monell cases attempting to hold municipalities liable through state laws 
were unsuccessful. E.g., Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 7S4 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Arguably, 
these cases were decided wrongly and should not be dispositive. See Kates & Kouba, 
supra note 130, at 160-61. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,200 the United States Supreme 
Court held that punitive damages may not be assessed against mu­
nicipalities in suits brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 187l,20I The Fact Concerts Court studied its prior decision of 
Monell v. New York Department ofSocial Services,202 which reversed 
Monroe v. Pape ,203 and held that cities may be liable for violations 
of civil rights under section 1983. As in those cases, the Fact Con­
certs Court was concerned with carrying out the policies of section 
1983. These policies were to compensate for and deter further viola­
tions of civil rights. The Fact Concerts Court also examined the pol­
icies behind punitive damages and found that neither the retributive 
or deterrent purposes of punitive damages nor the purposes behind 
section 1983 were served by such awards against municipal 
governments. 
Fact Concerts, however, does not mean that a plaintiff is fore­
closed from obtaining punitive damages from a municipal defend­
ant. Some state laws allow such damages to be awarded. Contrary 
to Fact Concerts' blanket prohibition against it, two strategies are 
available when seeking to attain this type of remedy in those states 
which allow it: section 1988 and pendent jurisdiction. 
The use of section 1988 is the strategy with less potential for 
success in urging that punitive damages be awarded against munici­
palities. The requirements of the three-part test for applying state 
remedies through section 1988 cannot be easily met. The court may 
not view the denial of punitive damages as a deficiency in the federal 
remedial scheme embodied in section 1988 and may find that per­
mitting such damages destroys any uniformity that this scheme may 
possess. Additionally, although section 1983 is silent as to damages, 
the rule laid down in Fact Concerts may be seen as an accurate inter­
pretation of the federal rule intended by Congress. Thus the appli­
cation of a state law that permits punitive damages against a 
municipality may be viewed as being inconsistent with the federal 
rule. Punitive damages against a municipality, therefore, do not 
seem to be forthcoming through use of section 1988. 
Use of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, however, may be 
successful as the state claim may be appended to the federal section 
200. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
201. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). 
202. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
203. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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1983 claim. Federal courts have power over a state claim when it 
arises from a common nucleus of operative fact with a substantial 
federal claim such that the two claims, when brought together, com­
prise one constitutional case unless the relevant jurisdictional stat­
utes preclude the appending of such a state claim. Once the power 
of the federal court has been ascertained, however, the court still 
retains discretion over whether to assert pendent jurisdiction. Using 
this discretionary power, federal courts may determine that the state 
and federal claims should be heard together in a federal court. A 
plaintiff, therefore, might be able to collect punitive damages from a 
municipal defendant in this manner. Although the holding of Fact 
Concerts would seem to forbid such a result, the use of pendent ju­
risdiction to obtain punitive damages from municipal defendants in 
section 1983 actions diminishes the impact of Fact Concerts. Al­
though the Court did not address the use of this judicially-created 
doctrine, the rights of victims of civil rights violations for whom pu­
nitive damages seem warranted or essential may be fully vindicated 
through its use. 
Marcia E. Prussel 
